Criminal Appeal

Sex Crimes, Statute of Limitations, And Apprendi

California Penal Code section 803(g) permits the filing of a criminal complaint for certain sex crimes within one year of the date on which the identity of the suspect is conclusively established by DNA testing, even if the otherwise applicable statute of limitations period has already elapsed.

Division Five of California's First District Court of Appeal held today that Apprendi does not require submitting to the jury the question of whether the statute of limitations was properly extended pursuant to section 803(g). According to the Court, by providing for extension of the statute of limitations in certain circumstances, section 803(g) does not define the conduct constituting the underlying offense or establish the level of punishment applicable to the defendant’s conduct. Rather, section 803(g) only regulates the time at which child sexual abuse defined and punished elsewhere in the Penal Code may be charged. Although the right to maintain the action is an essential part of the final power to pronounce judgment, that right constitutes no part of the crime itself.

Moreover, the Court concluded that the defendant forfeited his right to challenge the applicable statute of limitations on appeal by failing to object at trial.

The Court also ruled that battery is a lesser included offense of lewd acts upon a minor. As a result, the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of battery, which it did not do here. Under the facts of this case, the Court determined that the defendant was prejudiced by the instructional error and reversed the relevant conviction.

The unanimous decision was authored by Justice Linda M. Gemello.

People v. Thomas, no. A111109 (Cal.Ct.App. (1st Dist., Div. 5) filed 1/18/07)

Cal.Supreme Court: "force" has no special meaning in rape statute. People v. Griffin, no. S109734 (Cal. Supreme Court, Aug. 9, 2004). Unlike a conviction for a lewd act (Cal. Pen. Code sec. 288), the term force does not have a specialized meaning in the rape statute. (In a section 288 prosecution, a conviction requires proof of “physical force substantially different from or substantially greater than that necessary to accomplish the lewd act itself.”

This was a unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Baxter.

Amendments of Rape Statutes to Delete Hardship From Definition of Duress Did Not Alter Definition of Duress for Other Sex Offenses---such as a lewd act by force, duress, etc.---Which Continue to Include Threat of Hardship in Definition of Threat. People v. Leal, no. S114399 (Cal.Supreme Court, Aug. 5, 2004).

This was largely a battle of legislative intent. Justice Moreno authored the majority opinion; Justice Kennard dissented.