Failure to Raise Claim---Even Fundamental Constitutional Claim---at Trial Precludes State Court Habeas Review. In re Seaton, no. S067491 (Cal.Supreme Court, Aug. 23, 2004).

The Court summarized related habeas cognizability rules:

Waltreus rule (In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225): "precludes a habeas corpus petitioner from raising a claim that was raised and rejected on appeal."

Dixon rule (In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759): "bars a habeas corpus petitioner from raising a claim that was not, but should have been, raised on appeal."

Harris: In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 834: " neither rule [Waltreus & Dixon] bars a claim of constitutional error that is 'clear and fundamental, and strikes at the heart of the trial process.' (Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 834.) Harris does indeed allow a convicted defendant to file a habeas corpus petition raising claims of fundamental constitutional error even when those claims were previously rejected on appeal, or when the defendant did not, but should have, raised them on appeal."

Now, the Seaton Rule: "But Harris said nothing about allowing a defendant to raise such claims in a habeas corpus proceeding when no objection was made at trial." Claims---even fundamental constitutional error---not raised at trial cannot be raised in state habeas proceedings.

The court reasoned that to permit raising such claims on habeas would defeat the general forfeiture barring appellate review of claims not raised. The court also explained that IAC claims are the recourse for such forfeitures, and that the announced rule would not bar a Brady claim.

Note: the court did not address whether this procedural rule would bar a state habeas court from considering a claim of lack of fundamental jurisdiction.

Justice Kennard authored the 5-judge majority opinion. Justice Werdeger concurred, contending there was no reason to announce that the new procedural bar applied to fundamental constitutional claims because the petitioners claims did not meet that standard.

Justice Brown dissented, describing the new rule as putting "form-over-substance," and adhering to her view that addressing the claims on the merits---which the court's ultimately does anyway, at least internally---makes more sense than a Byzantine system of procedural bars:

I have previously expressed my view that “creating a Byzantine system of procedural hurdles, each riddled with exceptions and fact-intensive qualifications, only undermines . . . the goals they purport to serve: integrity of judgments, finality, and comity.” (In re Gallego (1998) 18 Cal.4th 825, 842 (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.); see also In re Sanders (1999) 21 Cal.4th 697, 730 (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.).) Since, at least in the capital context, the court’s internal practice generally ensures full merit review irrespective of procedural bars (see Gallego, at p. 852 (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.)), consideration of possible defaults can only delay finality and invite disregard in the federal courts given the difficulty in determining whether we invoke them with sufficient regularity. (See id. at pp. 843-845 (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.).)